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Note

The Concept of Religion
Eduardo Pefialver

1.

INTRODUCTION: WHY A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFINITION
OF RELIGION IS DESIRABLE

The First Amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."' The great majority of modern judicial decisions interpreting the
Religion Clauses have focused on determining what constitutes a "law
respecting the establishment" or what is involved in "prohibiting the free
exercise.",2 Far less frequently, however, have the courts expressly considered
the meaning of the concept that stands at the very heart of the Religion
Clauses: religion. At first glance, such an endeavor may seem to be altogether
unnecessary. Religion is a commonly used and widely understood term in our
everyday language, not some obscure term of art in need of technical
definition. Indeed, when the Supreme Court discusses "religion," most of the
time it uses the word unreflectively, as if it were completely self-defining.'
This laissez-faire approach assumes that religion should be used for
constitutional purposes in the same way that it is used in everyday language

I. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that a rabbi's prayer at a public high
school graduation ceremony constituted an establishment of religion): Emplo)mci D1% %Smith. 494 U S
872 (1990) (holding that Oregon's dismissal of two Native Americans for their religious use of peyote did
not violate the employees' free exercise rights). Edwards v. Aguillard. 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding that
a Louisiana law requiring public schools to ieach creation scicnce whenever esolution was taught was an
unconstitutional establishment of religion): Wallace %,.Jaffree. 472 U.S 38 (1985) (holding that a daily
period of silence in Alabama public schools amounted to an establishment of religion). Wisconsin v Yodct.
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that mandatory high school attendance laws stolatcd the free exercise rights
of Amish parents).
3. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (limiting the exemption of children from mandatory school
attendance laws to religious groups without supplying a definition of religion to help separate such groups
from secular ones).
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and, further, that its meaning and application are readily apparent.' Many
words used in the Constitution, however, are assigned completely different
meanings for purposes of constitutional adjudication from those they possess
in everyday language. "Speech" is one obvious example. Constitutional
protection of "speech" under the First Amendment goes far beyond what we
normally mean when we use the word, 5 covering such diverse forms of
expression as burning the American flag,6 wearing a black armband,7 and
picketing with a sign.' On the other hand, many words (for example,
"majority"'9) possess the same meaning in constitutional jurisprudence that
they have in everyday language. To argue, then, that no definition of religion
is necessary is to say that "religion" is more like "majority" than it is like
"speech." Such a position, however, requires justification. In other words, even
to deny the need for a definition of religion for the purposes of constitutional
adjudication is to propose a definition of sorts (that is, "the everyday, clear
meaning of the term"), one that must be defended.'0 In a sense, then, the
discussion of a constitutional definition is unavoidable.
Moreover, the definition of religion for First Amendment purposes is not
merely an academic exercise on which nothing really turns. In Malnak v.
Yogi," for example, a federal court's decision to classify the Science of
Creative Intelligence-Transcendental Meditation (SCI-TM) as a religion meant
that it could no longer be taught as an elective in public schools. In Africa v.
Pennsylvania, 2 the Third Circuit's decision not to recognize MOVE as a
religion resulted in its refusal to grant Frank Africa free exercise protection for
his requested diet of raw foods while in prison. In these and other cases, one
sees most clearly what is potentially at stake in defining "religion" for the First
Amendment. 13
4. The Framers probably shared these assumptions. See ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICII,
A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 90 (1990). As a judge on the Third Circuit, Adams wrote
two highly influential opinions on the issue of defining religion. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025
concurring).
(3d Cir. 1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F2d 197, 200-15 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J.,
5. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-1 to -39 (2d ed. 1988)

(describing Supreme Court jurisprudence on "speech").
6. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
7. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
8. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
9. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 1, cI. 3.
10. Some commentators have taken the view, for example, that "religion" in the First Amendment is
more like "speech," arguing that "religion" should be construed much more broadly for constitutional
purposes than it would be in ordinary language. See, e.g., Note, Towards a ConstitutionalDefinition of
Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056, 1056 (1978) (advocating the inclusion of whatever constitutes a person's
"ultimate concern" within "religion" for First Amendment purposes).
II. 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir, 1979) (per curiam).
12. 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981).
13. The definition of religion in the First Amendment has, at least in part, played a role in many other
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 US. 163, 166 (1965) (holding that a man's opposition to war
based upon his "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes" is "religious"),
discussed infra notes 38-51 and accompanying text; United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the Church of Marijuana is not a religion), discussed infra note 78; Alvarado v. City of San
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Because the classification of a group or individual as religious or

nonreligious is directly related both to the provision of benefits under the Free
Exercise Clause 4 and to the imposition of burdens under the Establishment

Clause,'" fundamental notions of fairness require that courts be prevented
from making arbitrary or inequitable classifications. The danger of bias in
Religion Clause jurisprudence is a very real one. Given the fact that, as
Frederick Gedicks points out, "[nlo Jewish, Muslim, or Native American
plaintiff has ever prevailed on a free exercise claim before the Supreme
Court," 16 there is reason to be concerned that bias might operate in judicial

Jose, 94 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that commissioning a statue of Qucizalcoatl. an ancient Aztec
god, is not a religious act for Establishment Clause purposes): Peloza v Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. Nos
92-55228 & 92-55644, 1994 WL 382635 (9th Cir. July 25. 1994) (holding that "eolutionism" is not a
religion); Johnson v. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections. 661 F. Supp 425 (WD Pa 1987) (holding that
the "Spiritual Order of Universal Beings," a group founded by the plaintiff. is not a religion)
14. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v City of Hialeah. 508 U S 520 t1993) (holding
that a law against killing animals, which was passed in order to present the exercise of the Santeina
religion, was a violation of the group's First Amendment right,,)
15. See, e.g., Malnak, 592 F.2d at 200 (per cunam).
16. FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RIETORIC Ot1 CHURCHi AND STATI

116 01995)

Although

plaintiffs from minority religious groups have won free exercise claims in lower courts, such 'ictoncs are
relatively rare. A computer search reaffirmed Gedicks's assertion. Search of WESTLAW. Allfeds Database
(May 26, 1997) (terms and connectors search for cases containing "'freeexercise") Oser the past two years.
I could find only one case in which a non-Christian plaintiff prevailed on a free exercise clali in the lower
federal courts. See Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir 1995) (upholding a free exercise claim by
Sikh students seeking accommodation of their possession of ceremonial daggers on school property. despite
a generally applicable no weapons policy). The same search, however, yielded a sanet) of cases in which
the free exercise claims of non-Christians were denied, see. e.g. May v.Baldwin. 10) F3d 557 t9th Cir)
(rejecting a free exercise claim by a Rastafarian inmate who did not want to unbraid his dreadlocks). cert
denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3282 (1997); Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241 (4th Cir 1997) (rejecting a free exercise
claim by a prisoner deprived of his "prayer pipe"); Fawaad v. Jones. 81 F 3d 1084 11th Cir )(rejecting
a free exercise claim by a Muslim prisoner who was forced to use his gisen name in addition to the
Muslim name he had chosen upon conversion to that faith), cert. deted. 66 U S LW 3282 (1997).
Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir.) (rejecting a free exercise claim by a Natise-Ameincan pnsoner
seeking access to a sweat lodge and permission to grow long hair). cert. denied, 117 S Ct 193 (1996).
Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a free exercise claim by a Rastafanan seeking to
grow long hair), and a number of cases in which the free exercise claims of Chnstian plaintiffs ,ere
upheld, see, e.g., Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding a free exercise claim
by a Catholic priest and bishop concerning a prosecutor's secret taping of a confession by a suspect to a
Catholic priest); Tucker v. California Dep't of Educ.. 97 F3d 1204 (9th Cir 1996) (holding that a rule
barring employees from posting religious messages at a Christian plaintiff's workplace violated his free
exercise rights); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the refusal of pnsons to
make exceptions to a no jewelry policy toaccommodate prisoners seeking to wear crucifixes violated the
prisoners' free exercise rights), vacated on other grounds, 117 S Ct. 2502 (1997)
I am not making a strong statistical claim here, but merely suggesting the possibility of judicial bias
against non-Christian plaintiffs. In a country in which most people consider themselscs to be Chnstian. it
might be argued that the majority of free exercise claims would be made by Christians and that therefore
it is not surprising to find a numerical disparity between free exercise victories by Christians and nonChristians. On the other hand, it might be the case that. in a country where most people are Christian. the
laws are written in such a way that they do not interfere with the free exercise of the majority religion If
this is the case, we would expect more free exercise claims to be made by non-Christians and hence a
statistical disparity in favor of non-Christian plaintiffs. There is no a pnon way to determine which
possibility actually obtains. Clearly, further empirical research (more rigorous than my simple WESTI..AW
search) needs to be done on this issue.
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efforts to define religion.' 7 One way to restrain potentially arbitrary
decisionmaking is to reduce the scope for judicial discretion regarding the
constitutional meaning of religion.
Scholars have suggested a wide variety of definitions for "religion" in the
First Amendment. A 1978 note in the Harvard Law Review advocated a
functional approach to the definition of religion that would treat "religion" like
"speech" and protect a very broad range of belief systems-whatever
constitutes a person's "ultimate concern."' 8 The note's proposal has been
persuasively criticized by Jesse Choper, however.' 9 Several scholars, rejecting
a broad definition like that endorsed by the Harvard note, have proposed
content-based definitions; that is, they have attempted to find some essence
within all religious belief systems according to which such systems can be
distinguished from nonreligious belief systems. Choper, for example, has
proposed a definition based upon the presence of a belief in "extra-temporal
consequences" to human action.20 Andrew Austin has proposed a definition
based upon the presence of "faith.",21 George Freeman, however, has
presented a devastating critique of efforts to elaborate content-based definitions
of religion. 22 Along with Kent Greenawalt, 23 Freeman has proposed an
analogical approach to determining what constitutes a religion; that is, a
methodology for deciding if a belief system is or is not a religion, rather than
a definition in the dictionary sense.24
In this Note, I advocate construing "religion" under the First Amendment
in its evolving, everyday sense. In so doing, I seek to build upon the work of
Freeman and Greenawalt by developing in more detail their analogical
methodology for determining whether or not a specific belief system is a
religion. In Part II, I survey the present judicial disagreement regarding the
best way to define religion. In Part III, I explore three preliminary issues: I
begin by arguing that "religion" in the First Amendment should be read
17. Cf ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 4, at 92 (admitting that the definition of religion presents
real dangers of western bias).
18. Note, supra note 10, at 1056.
19. See Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the FirstAmendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 59397.
20. See id. at 597-604. This definition fails, however, because belief in extra-temporal consequences
to human action (that is, reward or punishment) is not a necessary feature of belief systems that almost all
would concede to be religious. Ancient Judaism, for example, professed no such belief. See Wayne T.
Pitard, Afterlife and Immortality, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE BIBLE 15, 15-16 (Bruce M. Metzger
& Michael D. Coogan~eds., 1993).
21. See Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REV. I,
33-43 (1991-1992). As Austin himself notes, however, faith by itself is not sufficient for something to be
called a religion. See id. at 40-43. Austin therefore adds the requirement of faith in a "greater power than
man." Id. at 42. This addition makes Austin's definition unworkably vague and seems to convert it into
a theistic definition (at the expense of nontheistic religions).
22. See George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Searchfor the ConstitutionalDefinition of "Religion,"
71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1534-48 (1983).
23. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984).
24. See Freeman, supra note 22, at 1553; Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 762, 767-78.
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narrowly to refer only to religion and not to some broader concept like
conscience; I then reject the possibility of a dictionary-style definition (that is,
one that simply lists the "essences" of religion); and finally, I highlight the
problem of western bias in the definition of religion. From this exploration I
develop three criteria that any sound constitutional definition should satisfy. In
Part IV, I draw upon the work of Freeman and Greenawalt to argue that the
best way to determine whether or not a belief system is a religion is through
a process of analogy, based upon Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of
language. I therefore propose a methodology for conducting this analogical
process that takes into account the evolutionary nature of language and (in an
effort to improve upon the proposals of Greenawalt and Freeman) tries to
minimize the scope for judicial bias. Although I do not believe that my
proposed methodology is a perfect solution, I think it represents a significant
improvement over present definitions.

II. THE LACK OF CONSENSUS IN THE COURTS
A. The Supreme Court
Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to elaborate an
authoritative definition of religion, it has addressed the issue in a number of
cases stretching back into the nineteenth century. "- The first of these cases
was Davis v. Beason,26 an 1890 decision upholding an Idaho law that
required electors to swear an oath that they were not polygamists. Davis, a
Mormon, was convicted of falsely swearing to the oath. As part of a challenge
to his conviction, he argued that the law represented an establishment of
religion insofar as it prevented Mormons from acting as electors in the Idaho
territory. In the course of his opinion for the court rejecting Davis's claim,
Justice Field defined religion theistically.
Defending the required oath, Justice Field outlined his understanding of
religion: "The term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to
his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his will." 27 In addition to the presence of a
"Creator," Field also required a certain conformity between the teachings of
the group in question and the prevailing morality of "all civilized and Christian
countries."' ' Indeed, at least part of the reason Field rejected Davis's

25. The Supreme Court and appellate court cases discussed in this part arc widely regarded by
commentators as representing the most significant judicial discussions on the topic of the definition of
religion. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 19, at 587-91 (summarizing the Supreme Court junsprudence on the
issue of defining religion).
26. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
27. Id. at 342.
28. Id. at 341.
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establishment claim was that he thought polygamy too outrageous a practice
to be "a tenet of religion. 29
Adherence to this narrow definition was facilitated by the relative religious
homogeneity of the United States before the twentieth century.3 Indeed, the
connection between the religious demography of the United States (at least as
perceived by the Court) and the narrow conception of religion was made
explicit in United States v. Macintosh,31 a case that reaffirmed the theistic
definition. "We are a Christian people," the Court wrote, "according to one
another the equal right of religious freedom, and acknowledging with reverence
the duty of obedience to the will of God. 32
Over the course of the twentieth century, largely as a result of
immigration, the United States experienced an explosion both in the population
of non-Christians and in the number of different religious sects operating
within the country.33 The resulting increase in religious diversity put pressure
on the Court's narrow, theistic definition of religion and on the related
understanding of the United States as a Christian country.34 The Davis
definition was not expressly repudiated, however, until 1961 in Torcaso v.
Watkins.3 5 In Torcaso, the Court struck down a provision of the Maryland
constitution requiring officeholders to declare their belief in God. The Court
reasoned that such a provision favored one category of religions (theistic) over
another (nontheistic) in violation of the Establishment Clause. 36 For the first
time, the Court admitted the existence of nontheistic religions and extended
First Amendment protection to them. In a famous footnote, Justice Black
observed that "[a]mong religions in this country which do not teach what

29. Id. at 341-42 ("To call their advocacy [of polygamy] a tenet of religion is to offend the common
sense of all mankind.")
30. Although by the late 19th century the United States contained a diversity of sects, almost all
religious people were Christians and therefore unlikely to object to a definition of religion that excluded
nontheistic religions. See J. GORDON MELTON, The Development of American Religion: An Interpretive
View, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS 1, 14-15 (5th ed. 1996).
31. 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
32. Id. at 625 (citing Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,470-71 (1892)), The theistic
definition from Davis is quoted directly in a dissent by Justice Hughes, see id. at 634 (Hughes, J.,
dissenting), but the majority clearly applied the same theistic definition.
33. See WINTHROP S. HUDSON, RELIGION IN AMERICA 244-46 (4th ed. 1987). The religious
homogeneity of the United States prior to the 20th century should not be exaggerated, however, because
some variation did exist. See id. at 179-87. Prior to the immigration of large numbers of Asians in the late
19th century and the annexation of Hawaii in 1898, however, very few nontheists practiced their religions
in the United States. See id. at 3-4, 108, 244 (describing religious pluralism in the United States before the
beginning of the 20th century as pluralism within a Christian consensus); Melton, supra note 30, at 14-15
(describing the changing religious demography of the United States during the 20th century). There was
little pressure on a theistic definition of religion. The number of religious bodies in the United States has
exploded over the course of this century. See MELTON, supra note 30, at 15; J. GORDON MELTON,
Selectionsfrom the Introduction to the FirstEdition, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS, supra
note 30, at xvii, xvii.
34. See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 14-6.
35. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
36. See id. at 489-90, 495.
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would generally be considered belief in the existence of God are Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.
Following just a few years later, United States i Seege? confirmed the
broader conception of religion endorsed by Justice Black in Torcaso. The case
39
concerned Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
which exempted from combatant training and service all those who, "by reason
of religious training and belief, are conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form."' The statute defined "religious training and belier' as "an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior
to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral
code."'"
Seeger had been convicted for refusing induction during the Vietnam
War.42 His opposition to war was based on his "'belief in and devotion to
goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely
ethical creed."' 43 Claiming that its understanding of "religion" was shared by
modem theologians like Paul Tillich, the Court held that a "sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel
to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption" is
religious." What the Court meant by "parallel" is not entirely clear, but it
seems to have had in mind the strength with which an individual is committed
to her belief system. 5
Although Seeger was technically a statutory case, the Court appears to
have understood its broad definition of religion as having constitutional
significance. Immediately after presenting the "parallel position" test, for

37. Id. at 495 n.l 1. The breadth of Black's notion of religion is often overstated "'EtcalCulture" and

"Secular Humanism" were not references to broad social movements, but to specfic organizations, as is
made clear by the two cases cited by Black in support of their inclusion. See id. (citing Washington Ethical
Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (1957); Fellowship of Humanity % County of Alameda. 315

P.2d 394 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)).
38. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
39. Pub. L. No. 80-759. § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612. 613 (1948) (codified at 50

S C app. § 456(j) (1958))

40. Id.
41. Id.

42. To some extent, the historical context may be relevant here. Perhaps in part because of the
escalating war in Vietnam, the Supreme Court shied away from the option of holding the statute
unconstitutional (and thus leaving inductees without the possibility of conscientious objection), and instead
sought to broaden the meaning of "religion" within the statute itself. Cf Robert L Rabin. When Is a
Religious Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Erercise. 51 COR'NELL L.Q. 2.31.
238-39 (1966) (speculating about the Court's reluctance to leave people without the means of claiming

conscientious objector status). That this concern is not the entire story, however, is indicated by the fidelity
of the Seeger definition to the Court's broad language in Torcaso in 1961.
43. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166 (quoting Seeger's letter to the draft board).
44. Id. at 176; see also id. at 180 (citing 2 PAUL TiLtuciI. SYSTh.MAi1C TIIEOLOGY 12 (1957))

45. Evidence for this view can be found in the Court's statement that, in interpreting "Supreme Being"
as used in the statute, it was faced with a choice of interpreting the term to require belief in the "orthodox
God" or in a "broader concept of a power or being, or a faith. 'to which all else is subordinate ' Id at 174
(quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OFT4E ENGLISH LANGL AGE 2105 (2d ed 1943))

HeinOnline -- 107 Yale L.J. 797 1997-1998

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 107: 791

example, the Court explained that its construction "avoids imputing to
Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and
excluding others. 46 Such an intent would have violated the Establishment
Clause, as the Court had clearly stated in Torcaso 7 Further, in his
concurring opinion, Justice Douglas argued that the broad reading of the statute
was required to avoid holding it unconstitutional.48
In adopting this definition of religion, the Court made clear that it was not
extending the protection of the First Amendment beyond the bounds of what
it considered to be religion in the colloquial sense.49 But the Court's parallel
position test bears little resemblance to what most people would consider to
be religion.50 Almost anything can occupy a place in a person's life parallel
to the place of God in the life of the traditional theistic believer. Utility, for
example, holds a position in the lives of many utilitarians (and some
economists) parallel to that of God in the lives of traditional theists (that is, as
an absolute good toward which all human action should be directed). Few
people, however, have advocated treating utilitarianism as a religion. The
parallel position test, then, is more appropriate as a definition of conscience
than of religion.5 1 Despite this apparent overbreadth, the Court substantially
reaffirmed (or even expanded) the Seeger definition in Welsh v. United
52
States.
Perhaps realizing the problematic implications of its broad language, the
Court appears to have shifted back toward a narrower conception of religion
in Wisconsin v. Yoder.53 The Yoder Court made a strong distinction between
"secular considerations," 54 which were not considered valid bases for
challenging state regulation under the First Amendment, and "claims...
rooted in religious belief, '55 which were. The Court demonstrated the
46. Id. at 176.
47. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493 (1961).
48. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring). This constitutional reading of the Seeger
holding has been endorsed by several lower courts and most scholars. See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d
197, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Choper, supra note 19, at 588; Donald A. Giannella, Religious
Liberty Nonestablishment, andDoctrinal Development:PartL The Religious Liberty Guarantee,80 HARV.
L. REV. 1381, 1425 (1967); Rabin, supra note 42, at 238.
49. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180 ("[W]e believe this construction embraces the ever-broadening
understanding of the modem religious community.").
50. See Austin, supra note 21, at 15. But see A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., Defining Religion in Operational
and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 479, 497 (1968) (praising the Seeger definition as a step in
the right direction).
5I. I understand conscience to be a broader concept than religion, as it encompasses both religiously
and nonreligiously motivated beliefs. See infra Section III.A (discussing the reasons for rejecting a broad
understanding of "religion" in the First Amendment).
52. 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970) (including within the "parallel position" definition someone who crossed
the word "religion" off of his application for conscientious objector status and who described his beliefs
as based upon his readings in "history and sociology").
53. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For discussions of the apparent narrowing of the Court's definition in Yoder,
see Austin, supra note 21, at 17; and Choper, supra note 19, at 585.
54. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
55. Id. at 215.
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narrowing of its understanding of "religion" through its choice of an example
of "secular" motivation: Thoreau's rejection of the social values of his time
and his subsequent isolation at Walden Pond. 6 Thoreau's beliefs, however,
would almost certainly have passed as religion under the "parallel position"
definition from Seeger and Welsh.57
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not dealt directly with the issue
of defining religion. 5' The current Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
definition of religion is therefore in a state of some uncertainty. Before Yoder,
the jurisprudence was characterized by a steady broadening of the Court's
understanding of religion, but Yoder's apparent reversal of this trend makes it
difficult to predict how the Court will treat definitional questions in the future.
B.

The Courts of Appeals

Where the Supreme Court has been hesitant to tread in recent years, lower
courts have proved themselves more willing to experiment. Several federal
judges have formulated definitions of religion for use in First Amendment
cases. The most influential of these definitions is the three-part inquiry
proposed by Judge Adams of the Third Circuit.
The Adams "test" was first formulated in a concurring opinion in Malnak
v. Yogi. 59 The plaintiffs in Malnak were seeking an injunction against the
teaching of a course entitled Science of Creative Intelligence-Transcendental
Meditation (SCI-TM) in New Jersey public high schools. The course was
6
offered as an elective at five schools during the 1975-1976 academic year. 0
The textbook used in the course was developed by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi,
the founder of SCI-TM. Each member of the class was given his own mantra
to be chanted during meditation. In order to receive the mantra, however, the
student had to attend a puja (held 6off school grounds on Sundays), at which
offerings were made to Guru Dev. 1
In a per curiam decision, the Third Circuit held that SCI-TM was a
religion.62 In his concurring opinion, Judge Adams drew on the "parallel
position" test in Seeger to construct a "definition by analogy": 61 'The modem
56. See id. at 216. Thoreau's motivation, the Court said. "was philosophical and personal rather than

religious." Id.
57. Thoreau's beliefs were far more religiously based than. for example. those of the defendant in
Welsh. Compare Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340-41 (describing Welsh's beliefs). with Freeman. supra note 22, at

1559-60 (describing the religious roots of much of Thoreau's belief system)
58. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Indep. Employment Sec. Dis .450 U S 707. 714-16
(1981) (expressing hesitancy about the enterprise of determining the religious nature of beliefs, but stating

that certain beliefs could be too bizarre to qualify as "religious")
59. 592 F.2d 197, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams. J.. concurng).
60. See id. at 197-98 (per curiam).
61. Puja is Hindi for "'homage, reverence, worship." R.C. TIwARI ET AL. HINDI-E%.sI.S1 ENGLISHHINDI DICTIONARY 146 (1993). Guru Dev is translated, literally, as "teacher-god" Id at 56. 113

62. See Malnak, 592 F.2d at 199 (per cunam).
63. Id. at 207 (Adams, J.,
concumng).
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approach thus looks to the familiar religions as models in order to ascertain,
by comparison, whether the new set of ideas or beliefs is confronting the same
concerns, or serving the same purposes, as unquestioned and accepted
'religions.' '64 Adams produced three "indicia" to help determine when a "set
of ideas" is sufficiently analogous to "accepted" religions:65 first, the nature
66
of the ideas in question (religions generally deal with "ultimate" questions);
second, the comprehensiveness of the set of ideas; 67 and third, the "formal,
external or surface signs that may be analogized to accepted religions. 68
Judge Adams did not present the indicia as "essential" features of religion but
rather as "objective" guides to help systematize the judge's decisionmaking.69
In Africa v. Pennsylvania,0 Judge Adams was able to apply his Malnak
test in a majority opinion. Frank Africa, a prisoner who claimed to be a
"Naturalist Minister" for the MOVE organization, sought an injunction
requiring the state prison authority to provide him with a diet of raw fruit and
vegetables. Africa claimed that the principles of his religion, MOVE, required
the raw food diet. He described MOVE as a "revolutionary" organization,
"absolutely opposed to all that is wrong. ' '71 MOVE lacked a governing body
and engaged in no "ceremonies" or "rituals"; 72 instead, MOVE members
considered every act of life to be vested with religious meaning and
significance. The raw food diet requested by Africa was mandated by MOVE's
commitment to all that is natural and untainted: "'Water is raw, which makes
it pure, which means it is innocent, trustworthy, and safe, which is the same
73
as God."'

Applying the Malnak definition by analogy, Judge Adams went through
each of the three criteria and held that MOVE was not a religion. MOVE, he
decided, was an organization more interested in reforming society than in the
"spiritual or other-worldly." 74 Further, and perhaps for Adams most
importantly, MOVE was altogether lacking in the "structural characteristics"
typical of religions, 75 such as formal services, ceremonies, clergy, hierarchical
organization, efforts at propagation, and holidays. 76 Instead of a religion,
64. Id. at 207.
65. Id. at 207-08.
66. Id. at 208.
67. See id. at 209.
68. Id. at 210.
69. Id.
70. 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981).
71. Id. at 1026 (quoting Africa).
72. Id. at 1027.
73. Id. (quoting Africa).
74. Id. at 1034. The suggestion that religions must be concerned primarily with the "spiritual" or
"other-worldly," and not with reforming society, assumes a strong distinction between the public, secular
sphere and the private, devotional sphere that is characteristic of western, particularly Protestant, faiths.
75. Id. at 1035 (citing Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 (Adams, J., concurring)).
76. See id. The same bias that Judge Adams exhibited in focusing on MOVE's apparent lack of
concern with the "spiritual" or "other-worldly" can also be seen in this list of structural features typical of
religions. It is clear that his baseline of comparison was a Christian church community.
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Adams held, MOVE would
naturalism.""

be better described

as

"philosophical

Other courts have followed Judge Adams's methodological framework,

albeit with slight variation.78 A somewhat different definition of religion,
however, was proposed by Judge Cardamone of the Second Circuit in United
States v. Moon. 9 In that case, the court was faced with a constitutional

challenge to Reverend Moon's conviction for filing false tax returns. As part
of his rejection of Moon's appeal, Judge Cardamone considered the issue of

the definition of religion. He suggested the adoption of the definition proposed
by William James in The Varieties of Religious Erperience:o "'the feelings,

acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the
8
divine."' '

In sum, the state of the search for a constitutional definition of religion in
the courts could be charitably described as unsettled. The Supreme Court has

clearly abandoned its nineteenth-century theistic definition of religion.
Although it has moved in the direction of a broader understanding, it has yet
to provide an authoritative replacement. Meanwhile, the lower courts have
proved more willing to set out definitions in detail, but they have been unable
to agree among themselves as to a single meaning of the term. "2

77. Id. at 1035. Judge Adams limited his holding to MOVE as presented in the evidence before him
Perhaps as a result of his own uncertainty regarding thecorrect classification of theorganization. he left
open the possibility that a more thorough presentation of evidence could make a difference as to the result
of his analysis in the future. See id. at 1036 n.22.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996). In Meyers. the Tcnth Circuit
adopted a definition of religion following the same comparative approach as Adams in kalnak and Africa.
but using a larger number of indicia. The court provided five indicia: ultimate ideas, metaphysical beliefs.
moral or ethical system, comprehensiveness of beliefs, and accoutrements of religion (which in turn
included 10 sub-indicia). See id. at 1483-84. The case involved a defendant %,hotred to avoid conviction
for drug violations by arguing that he was the "founder and Reverend of the Church of Manjuana" and that
it was "his sincere belief that his religion commands him to use, possess, grow and distibute marijuana
for the good of mankind and the planet earth." Id. at 1479, The court only corsidered the definition of
religion with regard to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Pub. L No 103-141. 107 Stat
1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-I to -4 (1994)). but the close connection
between RFRA and prior Religion Clause jurisprudence would seem to imply that a definition of religion
for the purposes of RFRA adjudication would be relevant to the question of a constitutional detinmon In
any event, the Supreme Court has since held the RFRA unconstituional See City of Boerne v Flors. 117
S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
79. 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983).
80. WILUAM JAMES, VARIEMIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (Harvard Univ Press 1985) (1910)
81. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1227 (quoting JAMES. supra note 80. at 31) Interestingly. James referred to
his own proposed definition as "'arbitrary" and limited tts application to the purpose of thelectures from
which the definition was drawn. JAMES, supra note 80. at 32. 34
82. As with the discussion in the courts. scholarly debate ocr the correct definiion of religion for
First Amendment purposes has been inconclusive. Constraints on space prevent me from discussing in detail
the various definitions that have been proposed and their many weakness s. For a more detailed cntique
of the various definitions, see Freeman, supra note 22. at 1534-48
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III. FORMULATING A METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING WHAT
QUALIFIES AS A "RELIGION": PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

This part explores three issues that should be addressed before elaborating
my own methodology for determining what constitutes a "religion" under the
First Amendment. First, before I can describe the specific form of my
proposal, I must deal with the more general and logically prior question of
whether "religion" in the First Amendment means the same thing as religion
in the narrow, colloquial sense or whether it is a term, like "speech," whose
signification for constitutional purposes is far broader than our use of it in
everyday language. Second, I explore the nature of language and definitions
more generally to see what lessons can be drawn for my own endeavor.
Finally, I consider the problem of western bias and how it might manifest itself
in a constitutional determination of religion-status. From my consideration of
these three issues, I develop three criteria that I think any sound definitional
methodology must satisfy.
A. "Religion" in the First Amendment Means Religion
Several factors seem to point toward the appropriateness of limiting the
protection extended by the Religion Clauses to religion as the term is used in
everyday language: 83 first, the original intent of the Framers and the text of
the Constitution itself; second, the history of religiously motivated violence and
the vulnerability of religious groups to marginalization and persecution; and
third, the particular role religions play in the lives of their adherents. It is
important to note that in discussing these factors, particularly the second and
third, I am making an extremely limited claim. I do not argue that the history
of religious violence and the importance of religion to adherents justify
(independently of the Religion Clauses) constitutional protection of religion.
Instead, I simply argue that these factors weigh in favor of interpreting the
Religion Clauses restrictively, to protect a narrow understanding of religion (as
opposed to a broader concept, like "conscience"). Nonreligious belief, though
certainly worthy of constitutional protection, is more appropriately covered by
other provisions of the Constitution.
1. The Intent of the Framers
In the context of many provisions of the Constitution, the views of the
Framers are at least partially obscured by an incomplete record. In the case of
the signification of "religion" in the First Amendment, however, compelling
83. By this I mean a relatively narrow understanding of the word, one which excludes such systems
of thought as philosophy or mere ideology.
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evidence points strongly in the direction of a narrow understanding of the term.
In particular, the history of the drafting of the Religion Clauses sheds light on
the intentions of the Framers.
When the text of the First Amendment was being considered, several drafts
of the Religion Clauses were rejected before Congress settled on the final
form.s4 Significantly, earlier versions of the Religion Clauses expressly
included protection for "'rights of conscience.' "' One such version was
adopted briefly by Congress but was ultimately rejected in favor of a version
that explicitly protected only religion. 6 As Michael McConnell notes, this
initial consideration, and ultimate rejection, of the word "'conscience" can be
interpreted in either of two ways. First, one could assume that the Framers
decided not to include "conscience" in the final wording of the amendment
because they considered it to be redundant, with the protection of religion
already constituting a recognition of the general inviolability of conscience."
Second, one might interpret the Framers' refusal to include "'conscience" in the
First Amendment as reflecting a desire to limit its protection to the narrower
category of religion. 8
The latter of these two options is the more plausible and has been
endorsed by several scholars.8 9 Conscience, including as it does religious and
nonreligious motivation, is a far broader concept than religion. If the Framers
had wanted to eliminate the apparent redundancy of including both
"conscience" and "religion" while maintaining the protection of both, the most
appropriate way to do so would have been to eliminate the narrower word,
religion.
By itself, this appeal to original intent assumes that the views of the
Framers are the most relevant factor in determining the meaning of the
Religion Clauses; this assumption itself, however, is controversial and in need
of justification. 9° Further, an exclusive reliance on original intent would
mandate the adoption of the Framers' theistic definition of religion9' As I

84. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historncal Undersanding of Free Etertise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1481 (1990).
85. Id. (quoting I ANNALS OF CONG. 757-59. 796 (Joseph Gales ed. 1789))

86. See id.
87. See id. at 1495.
88. See id.
89. See id.; see also Freeman, supra note 22. at 1521-22 (arguing that the history of the congre~ssonal
debates should be interpreted as endorsing an intention by the Framer toprotect "'freedom of conscience
only in matters of religion" and not "freedom of conscience per se"). Stanley lngber. Religion or ldeoloi:v
A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses. 41 STAN L REV 233. 277-78 (1989) (endorsing the
narrow interpretation of the Framers' choice to omit the word "conscience" from the First Amendment)
90. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G

Sager. The Viilierabilit% of Conicience

The

Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct. 61 U CHI L RE' 1245. 1270 11994)
91. Madison, for example, defined religion as "the duty %%hich c oae to our Creator and the Manner
of discharging it." JAMES MADISON, To the Honorable the General Assenblh of the Comnionstealth of
Virginia. A Memorial and Remonstrance.. in TIlE MIND OF THIEFot NDER SOI, RCt.S Of- THlEPOLITICAL
THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 6,7 (Marvin Meyers ed. 1981 )
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argue below, such a static definition of religion would be inconsistent with the
evolutionary nature of language and would raise serious establishment
concerns. 92 The establishment problem may be more apparent than real,
however, because original intent concerning the actual meaning of religion is
itself inherently ambiguous. The Framers probably never considered the issue
of defining religion for the First Amendment at all, because they thought the
everyday meaning of the term was clear. Indeed, there is no way to distinguish
original intent to apply the First Amendment to religion in the everyday sense
of that word (at any given point in time) from original intent to apply the First
Amendment to a particular, theistic definition of religion. The two were, for
the Framers, one and the same thing.93
2.

The History of Religious Violence and the Vulnerability of

Religious Minorities
Modern legal scholars acknowledge the existence of a long history of
religiously motivated violence. 94 Moreover, some theologians have argued
that religious tolerance and understanding are the only hope the world has for
peace and survival. 95 Such a consistent tendency toward violent conflict has
not been demonstrated in the case of nonreligious conscience. Because
classification as a religion for First Amendment purposes involves the
imposition of establishment burdens (in addition to a grant of free exercise
protections), 97 it is necessary to tailor the application of the Religion Clauses
as narrowly as possible to those belief systems that truly need them.98 Thus
the history of violent religious conflict weighs in favor of a narrow reading of
"religion" as meaning religion in the everyday sense. 9
92. See infra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
93. Cf. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 4, at 90 (observing that the Framers probably thought that
the meaning of religion was self-evident).
94. See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 90, at 1282; Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as
Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSuES 313, 317 (1996).
95. See, e.g., HANS KUNG, GLOBAL RESPONSIBLITY 75-76 (1991).
96. See infra note 101. 1 would not deny that at times persons have been ruthlessly persecuted on
account of their nonreligious conscience, as in the communist red scares of the first half of the 20th
century. But this phenomenon has not been nearly as pervasive as religious persecution and is adequately
covered by other provisions of the Constitution.
97. See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
98. Further, both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses limit the freedom of the state. Thus,
an overly broad definition of religion could severely hamper the ability of the state to function effectively.
See Choper, supra note 19, at 592. Choper makes the plausible argument that because free exercise benefits
granted to religions constitute burdens on the state, the wider the definition of religion adopted, the less
robust the protections the Religion Clauses are likely to provide. See id. This provides another reason for
tailoring the Religion Clauses narrowly to those belief systems that need protection.
99. This historical justification is itself reinforced by original intent, because the bloody history of
religious conflict and intolerance in post-Reformation Europe was one of the major concerns that generated
support for the Religion Clauses among rationalist humanists like Madison. Cf. MADISON, supra note 91,
at I1 ("Torrents of blood have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular arm to extinguish
Religious discord .... ").
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This history of religious violence may be the result of a general refusal of

religious believers to submit the tenets of their faith to the standards of
rationality of those outside their religion.' °° Because each religion has its
own unique doctrinal "framework" assumptions, religious disagreements are

particularly unamenable to resolution through discussion. Different religions
operate within distinct, albeit overlapping, conceptions of rationality (for

example, with different ideas about what counts as a fair assumption or what
constitutes evidence pointing toward a particular conclusion), and they have

limited common vocabularies for resolving their disagreements. Thus debates
between adherents of different religious systems often devolve rapidly into
mutually contradictory assertions of the truth of each side's position. t" '

The sharp (and often violent) nature of religious disagreement in turn
engenders a unique vulnerability of minority religious belief and practice to
100. Norman Malcolm, drawing on Wittgenstem's concept of the "'language game." has compared the
discourse of an individual religion to a unique language game with its own internal logic. basic assumptions
("framework propositions"), and game-specific criteria for what counts as evidence See Norman Malcolm,
The Groundlessness of Belief, in REASON AND RELIGION 143 (Stuart C Bron ed. 1977j This ic'. of
religion as somehow less than "rational" by "objective" scientific standards has been challenged by more
orthodox philosophers of religion such as Cohn Lyas. See, e.g. Colin L)as. The Groundlessneus of
Religious Belief, in REASON AND REUGION. supra. at 158
Malcolm does not seek to denigrate religious belief as somehos less than reasonable Indeed.
following Wittgenstein, he rejects any game-independent notion of reasonableness See Malcolm. supra.
at 146. Scientific belief, he argues, is no more "'objectively'"reasonable than religious belief, but from the
perspective of one language game, behavior within another language game seems "unreasonable " Id at
152. It is thus impossible for someone operating from within one language game to justify her beliefs to
someone operating within another language game. See td at 151-52 Nevertheless. the presence of
individuals who, like Lyas, are willing to subject their "'religion" to the scrutiny of scientific and
philosophical standards of "reasonability" indicates the impossibility of using the rejection of some notion
of public reason within religion as a necessary condition for calling something a religion Such exceptions.
however, should not prevent us from making a broad argument about the value of protecting "'religion- as
such based on the role of reason within religions in general.
101. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel. Moral Conflict and Poliical Legittnacs. 16 PIL & Pt. U Af-- 215.
232 (1987) (describing debates between different religious believers as normalls consisting of bare
assertions of each side's truth). Philosophical ethicists have argued in a similar scin about the apparent
irresolvability of many moral and political judgments. See ALFRED Rt LES A'iER. L. %GL AGt:. TRti
%D
LOGIC 21-22 (1956) (arguing that moral disagreements not based on disagreements oer the "facts- of a
situation are irresolvable because moral judgments are fundamentally subjectt¢). ALASDAIR M.c'IY,
AFTER VIRTUE 6-8 (1981) (observing that modem moral and political disagreements are uniquely
irresolvable through rational discussion). But unlike philosophically denved moral or political judgments.
which are often experienced as dictated by the individual conscience, the religiously based belief is
experienced by the believer as imposed from outside by a reality that transcends the individual See lngbr.
supra note 89, at 282. Philosophical moral objectivists also think of ethical judgments as somehow
transcending the individual, see. e.g., IMMANUEL KANT. FUNDAMENT"AL PRI%CIPLE.S 0- TIIlE MVTAPHIYSICS
OF MORALS ('T'homas K. Abbott trans., The Bobbs-Memll Co. 1981) (1785) (setting forth a philosophical
moral system, the content of which transcends the individual moral subject), but as a ith other philosophical
ethicists, they participate in a shared philosophical mode of discourse that provides an altemati%e to violent
confrontation. I understand that not all philosophers agree as to what constitutes necessary and sufficient
conditions for "truth," but I believe that philosophers do share a more or less common mode of discourse.
or methodology, for evaluating and discussing such issues. The feeling that the religious belief is externally
imposed gives religiously motivated disagreements a sharper, more violent edge than disagreements based
on differences between secular ethical systems (for example. betaeen Kantianism and utilitarianism) To
the religious believer, the one who does not believe is often seen as one sho refuses to acknowledge a selfevident truth. The potential for violence resulting from the irresolvability of moral and political disputes,
however, is mitigated by their more transparent and self-conscious subjectivity
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marginalization.' °2 Because religious beliefs and practices generally cannot
be defended according to the nonbeliever's notion of rationality, 3 ' religious
dissenters are easily brushed aside as irrational or persecuted as dangerous
perversions of the natural order embraced by the majority.'0 4 Whether the
established system of belief is Christianity or (as is arguably the situation
today) a form of scientific empiricism,'0 5 the epistemological isolation of
minority religions from other forms of rationality (and, at the same time, from
06
majoritarian politics) renders them particularly susceptible to persecution.
This unique vulnerability of minority religious groups to violent persecution,
as evidenced by a long history of religious violence, justifies limiting the
application of "religion" in the First Amendment to religions.
3. The Role of Religion in the Lives of Adherents
The final reason for limiting Religion Clause protections to religions is the
irreplaceable role religions play in the lives of their adherents. While ethical
systems and ideologies can tell us how we should live, religions provide
answers to the ultimate question of why we should live. While science can try
to explain to us the process by which we have arrived here, religions help us

102. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 90, at 1282-83.
103. See Nagel, supra note 101, at 232.
104. See Leo Pfeffer, Equal Protection for Unpopular Sects, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 9,
9-10 (1979-1980).
105. For arguments that empirically based, scientific belief systems constitute the acceptable norm for
public discourse, see, for example, Nagel, supra note 101, at 232; and John Rawls, The Idea of an
Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (1987).

106. The experience of the Mormons in the 19th-century United States exemplifies this pattern.
Mormons were lampooned by their critics as "'men of perverted intellect."' KENNETH H. WINN, EXILES
INA LAND OF LIBERTY: MORMONS IN AMERICA, 1830-1846, at 72 (1989) (quoting Letter to the Editor of
the OHIO STAR, reprinted in PAINESVILLE TELEGRAPH, May 20, 1836). As would be expected from the
discussion of the nature of religious belief systems as language games, see supra note 100, the Mormons
also accused their critics of irrationality, see WINN, supra, at 73. The Mormons were tarred and feathered,
run out of town, and sometimes killed. See id. at 96-97, 139-42. Because of their minority status, the
Mormons' appeals to majoritarian political institutions were fruitless. See id. at 142-47. In a statement that
succinctly illustrates the inability of majoritarian political systems to protect religious minorities, the
Governor of Missouri explained his decision not to protect Mormon settlers from anti-Mormon violence:
"[T]he quarrel was between the Mormons and the mob," he said, explaining that the best solution was to
let the two sides "fight it out." Id. at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The treatment of adherents of the Santeria religion by some local communities provides a more recent
example of the vulnerability of minority religious groups to persecution through the majoritarian political
process. In Hialeah, Florida, for example, the city government sought to prevent the practice of the Santeria
religion by banning the killing of animals within city limits. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 526-28 (1993). Animal sacrifice plays an integral role in Santeria rituals.
See id. at 525. Santeria rituals have sparked resentment in other cities as well. See, e.g., Marty Sabota,
North Side Residents Upset About Animal Sacrifices, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEWS, Sept. 26, 1997. at IOD,
available in 1997 WL 13206688. The State Department has been accused of anti-Santeria bias for its
refusal to allow 31 Cuban babalawos (Santeria high priests) into the United States in August 1997 for a
religious conference in San Francisco. See Deborah Ramirez, U.S. Bans 31 Cubans from Religious Meeting,
FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 4, 1997, at IA, available in 1997 WL 11395827.
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to understand why we are here at all.'0 7 In other words, religions attempt to
provide answers to the fundamental questions of human meaning. Indeed,
anthropologist Morton Klass has argued that it is religion's meaning-giving
function, among other things, that distinguishes it from other types of belief
systems, and he makes this function the center of his proposed "operational"
definition of religion.'0 8 Although modern secular culture often seeks to
marginalize religious belief as -irrational,'"
the human need for the types
of explanation religions provide rises time and again to visibility. Whether it
be the mass suicide of UFO "cults"" 0 or private soul-searching alone at
night, human beings are repeatedly faced with the realization of their deep
need for religion and religious explanation."' The ability of religions to
fulfill a deeply rooted human longing makes them particularly precious and
worthy of protection. The singular importance of religions to the human
condition (combined with the burdening nature of the Religion Clauses)
represents another reason for reading the Religion Clauses narrowly as
protecting religion rather than a broader category of beliefs like conscience.
B.

Establishment Implications

Once one accepts the thesis that the protections of the Religion Clauses are
to extend only to religions, certain establishment issues arise. Several scholars
have argued that the adoption of an authoritative definition of religion creates
the risk of favoring the groups that fall within the definition at the expense of
those that do not, effectively establishing a certain form of religion."2 This
107. See. e.g., HERBERT MCCABE. GOD MATTERS 2-9 (1987) (arguing that science can ansver "'hov"
questions but only religion can answer "why" questions)
108. See MORTON KLASS,ORDERED UNIVERSES APPROACH.S t TTillE A% iRoPotOX;Y ot- Ri.toIo%
38 (1995). Klass argues that religion, as a universal institution. pros.ides ansvuers to fundunental "'vh)"
questions. See id.at 56. He points out. however. that the general ansvers to these tundattental ",hs"
questions are not interesting to adherents of a parttcular belief system, because these an%%%
crs are part o!
the framework of the adherents' worldview. the most bastc of their taken-for-granted assumption-, See id
Instead of answering the question "Why is there death"" the belieer is interested in explaining this
particular untimely death. See id. at 57. Although I agree %tih Klass's basic point that religton-, are unique
in their ability to answer these "why" questtons. I do not think this is adequate a a definition of religion
109. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 51-56 t 1993) tntcizing a "public square"
that excludes religious thinking or at least forces tt to be "bracketed" or translated). GtDIC"s. supra note
16, at 32-37 (discussing the hostility of modem, secular culture to%%,ard religious knou.ledge)
110. The recent mass suicide of the Heaven's Gate group became the occasion for ,idespread
reflection in the media on the unhealthy effects of the omerseculanration of Amencan culture See e. ,
Marty Kaplan, Maybe Reason Isn't Enough. N.Y. Ti ,iES. Mar 31. 1997. at A15 tdiscussing the mabilt
of secular culture to satisfy human needs for meaning)
11l.See. e.g., id.Kaplan descnbes this necd
This is the sadness at the hean of our secular Ies No one %%antsto h.e in a pointles.s, chaotic
cosmos, but that is the one that science has gien us. and that our culture has largely
championed. We may yearn for the divine. but our feet are stuck in the moral relatisism tor
even nihilism) that such a culture breeds. The post-modem Dadaism that's hip ioda, is thebcst
we can do: everything's a joke. But inside it feels aw.ful
Id.
112. See. e.g.. lngber, supra note 89. at 240: Val D Ricks. To God God's to Ctaear Catesars, and
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fear becomes reasonable only after the option of defining religion far more
broadly for constitutional purposes than for ordinary discourse has been
discarded. If a proposed definition excludes groups that most people agree are
religions, then it will clearly be invalid in that it establishes certain religions
by offering them protection not given to others." 3 Thus any constitutional
definition of religion must square with data drawn from our own intuitions
about what does or does not constitute a religion according to everyday
standards. To avoid running afoul of the Establishment Clause, a proposed
definition must conform as closely as possible to the general conception of
t4
religion used in everyday discourse."
C. The Evolutionary Nature of Language and the Problem with a
Dictionary-Style Definition of "Religion"
Before considering my own approach to the definitional methodology, it
is important to explore the nature of definitions in general with the aim of
understanding how they relate to word meaning. Theorists often assume that
learning the meaning of a word involves forming some abstract concept or
template that allows us to classify our experiences of the world around us as
either falling into or outside of this template."' According to this view, for
example, we learn from experience that "apples" are spherical, crispy, and
edible. When faced with a previously unencountered object possessing these
characteristics, we compare it with our template and call it an "apple." In using
the word "apple" we merely respond to the dictates of our concept. Generic
words like "apple" therefore denote the category of objects (known and
to Both the Defining of Religion, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1053, 1061-64 (1993); Jonathan Weiss, Privilege,
Posture and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 622 (1964); Sharon L. Worthing,
"Religion" and "Religious Institutions" Under the FirstAmendment, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 313, 345 (1980).
113. See Austin, supra note 21, at 6.
114. Establishment concerns would also seem to bar the adoption of a dual definition of religion such
as the one proposed by Professor Tribe in the first edition of his textbook on constitutional law. See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTmIT ONAL LAW § 14-6, at 831 (1978). Professor Tribe defined
religion for establishment purposes as that which is not arguably nonreligious and for free exercise purposes
as that which is arguably religious. See id. As Judge Adams noted in Malnak v. Yogi, however, such a
definition creates three categories of belief systems under the Religion Clauses: first, those covered neither
by the Establishment Clause nor by the Free Exercise Clause; second, those protected by the Free Exercise
Clause but not subject to the Establishment Clause; and third, those protected by the Free Exercise Clause
and subject to the Establishment Clause. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams,
J., concurring). The second group, likely to be made up of new religious groups, would be uniquely favored
in that it could (as both arguably religious and arguably nonreligious) invoke free exercise benefits without
suffering the burdens associated with the Establishment Clause. See id at 213. Perhaps for reasons such as
these, Professor Tribe has abandoned this proposal in the most recent edition of his textbook. See TRIBE,
supra note 5, § 14-6, at 1186.
115. This seems to have been the approach taken by John Locke in his discussion of natural kind
terms (terms that refer to natural categories, like species) and nominal essences. See JOHN LOCKE, AN
ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 260, 270 (A.D. Woozley ed., Meridian 1964) (1689).
Nominal essences, Locke explained, are the summation of all the ideas essential to the "sort." Id. The
membership of a particular in the sort is determined by its possession of the qualities that form the nominal
essence of that sort. See id.
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unknown) in our world that share in the complex of qualities that form our
concept of apple. Use of language is reduced by this model to following a
series of rules, and the process of definition involves a listing of the essential
features of our category-concept." 6
Such a rigid concept-based description of word meaning fails to capture
the flexible and evolutionary nature of language. In his philosophy of language,
Wittgenstein criticized this rigid view and developed an approach that found
word meaning to consist in our way of using words." 7 At its base level,
language is, for Wittgenstein, neither interpretation nor rule following, but
rather custom or practice." 8 Learning a language, or merely learning the
meaning of a word, involves learning how that word is used and applying it
accordingly, not merely learning some abstract definitional concept." 9
Under the rigid conceptualization of language, all that is involved in the
process of defining religion is a determination of what notions are essential to
our concept of religion--either on a functional or on a substantive level. When
faced with new groups or individuals claiming religion status, the adherent to
the rigid model believes that the groups are (in some sense) already "religions"
or not, depending upon their qualities. The result of our classification is
20predetermined by our definition.'
While Wittgenstein allows that our definitions (in the sense of our
customary use) are involved in the process of shaping our application of a
word to new situations, he denies that the results of this process are as
predetermined as the rigid model implies.' 2' Our decision to apply or not to
apply a word to a new situation is affected by the nature of our customary use
of the word, but at the same time, our decision to apply the word in a new
situation (or not to apply it) is itself part of the definitional process. For
example, Judge Adams's refusal in Africa

t.

Pennsylvania' 2 to classify

MOVE as a religion was determined by his conception of religion, but his
refusal also in part further defined religion for him. There is a dialectic
between our current use of the word and our future application of that word
116. See John McDowell, Wittgenstein on Following a Rule, tin
MEANIG AD RJERECE 257. 257.

288 (A.W. Moore ed., 1993).
117. Several philosophers of language have adopted this approach to sord meaning See, e g. id at
276; Gilbert Ryle, The TheorY ofMeanng. tin
THE IMPORTANCE or LANGt AGE 147. 162 (Max Black cd.

1962).
118. See McDowell, supra note 116. at 275.
119. See LUDWIG W-trGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL I"VESnGATIO'%S § 198. at 80 (G EM Anscombe

trans., MacMillan Co. 1953) ("[W]hat has the expression of a rule--say a s gn-pot-got to do ,ith my
actions? What son of connexion is there here?-Well. perhaps this one. I have been trained
to react to this
sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.").
120. According to William Alston (a philosopher of language heavily influenced by Wittgcnstem).
however, definitions are attempts to teach the meaning (that is. use) of a word by substtutming for it a word

or phrase whose use we already know. See WILuAM P. ALSToN. PHILOSOPHY Oi LAGL AGE 22 (1964)
121. See WtTrGENSTEIN, supra note 119. § 197. at 80; McDowell. supra note 116. at288
122. 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981). For a discussion of Africa. see supra notes 70-77 and

accompanying text.
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to new situations. Our current use plays some role in the process of
determining whether or not to apply the word in the future circumstance, but,
at the same time, the future application (or nonapplication) of the word alters
the customary use of the word itself. Thus the application of a word to new
circumstances has an evolutionary aspect built into it.
Wittgenstein's theory is supported by the observation that our use of
language does in fact evolve unpredictably over time. The indeterminacy of
this evolutionary process can be seen in the divergent evolution of word use
between isolated members of the same linguistic group faced with similar
environmental factors. A good example of such divergent evolution is the
difference in use of the word "torch" in American and British English. At the
time of the colonization of the Americas, the English application of the word
referred exclusively to a particular type of light carried in the hand.' 23 Since
the development of electric lights, however, a divergence in meaning has
occurred between British and American English. The British have extended the
application of the word "torch" to electric, hand-held lights, 2 4 while
Americans have not. 12 5 Although the two ways of using the word share a
common genealogy-that is, although at one point they were used in the same
way (i.e., had the same definition)-differing responses to the same new
situation have led to a subsequent divergence in meaning.
The meaning of the word "religion," like "torch," has evolved over time
and will likely continue to evolve. We can see such an evolution at work in
the Court's slow broadening of the definition of religion since the nineteenth
century, a phenomenon described above in Part II. In Davis v. Beason,126 the
Court unself-consciously defined religion as "one's views of his relations to
his Creator,"' 127 requiring a group to profess belief in God in order to be
considered a religion. Our growing understanding of other cultures, however,
demonstrated that many belief systems to which we would apply the word
"religion" do not involve belief in God. Hence, theism was dropped as a
12
necessary element of "religion."' 1
This gradually expanding evolution reveals the problems with seeking a
dictionary-style definition of religion. One such problem was discussed by
123. See 18 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 264 (2d ed. 1989).
124. See id.
125. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1500 (2d College cd.

1984).
126. 133 U.S. 333 (1890); see supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
127. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342.
128. Edward Conze, a scholar of Buddhist thought quoted by Justice Douglas in United States v.
Seeger, points out that the exact opposite could conceivably have occurred. Instead of extending our notion
of religion to include nontheistic groups, we could have declined to apply the word "religion" to those
groups at all. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 191 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing
EDWARD CONZE, BUDDHISM: ITS ESSENCE AND DEVELOPMENT 38-39 (1959)). Undoubtedly, the many

similarities between Christianity and nontheistic systems of thought like Buddhism made the conclusion
that the concept of God was not essential to religion the more likely result.
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Jonathan Weiss in his article Privilege, Posture and Protection,'- where he

expressed the fear that any authoritative constitutional definition of religion,
no matter how descriptively accurate of currently existing religions, would
effectively establish our present conception of religion at the expense of later
religions that might emerge. 30 It is possible that Weiss was objecting to a
situation in which the adopted definition failed to evolve along with the use
of the word "religion" in everyday language. Such a situation would indeed
raise establishment concerns. The adoption of such a static definition of
religion could be compared to the taking of a photograph. At the time it was
exposed, the photograph reflected reality quite accurately. As soon as the
photograph was shot, however, reality began to diverge from the captured
image, leaving the photograph as a mere relic of the past. Given the
evolutionary nature of language, the definition of religion adopted for the First
Amendment should have the ability to evolve along with the use of the word
in everyday language.
As the example of the theistic definition of religion shows, the law reacts
very slowly to developments in our everyday use of language. Although the
adoption of the theistic definition of religion was somewhat understandable
considering the religious composition of the United States in the nineteenth
century, by the early twentieth century the presence of theistic tenets could no
longer credibly be considered a requirement for a belief system to be
considered a religion. Nevertheless, the theistic definition managed to survive
as the official constitutional definition of religion until 1961, when the Court
finally overturned it in Torcaso v.Watkins."'
The persistence of the theistic definition of religion indicates the danger
involved in the Court's adopting a dictionary-style definition of religion for
constitutional purposes (that is, one that elaborates a list of "essences," the
presence of which constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for something
to be called a religion). Because it spells out essential characteristics, a
dictionary-style definition of religion runs the risk that the use of religion in
everyday language will broaden in the future (as occurred between the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries), leaving the courts with a definition of
religion that favors certain religions over others. Thus dictionary-style
constitutional definitions of religion carry within them the risk of the very
divergence between the constitutional definition and future everyday definition
that leads to establishment problems.'32 This establishment danger, in
129. Weiss, supra note 112.
130. See id. at 622.

131. 367 U.S. 488, 495 & n.Il (1961).
132. The opposite (though perhaps less likely) possibility, that the evcryda

defintion of religion

might become more narrow in the future, does not pose the same establishment ihreat If the c cryday
definition of religion becomes more narrow in the future than it is today, a constitutional definition of
religion that adhered to today's standards would simply protect more types of beha%torthan it had to This
would not create an establishment problem, however. Only a constitutional definition that is more narrow
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addition to the many problems inherent in trying to decide which features of
religion should be considered "essential,"' 133 points toward the unworkability
of a dictionary-style definition.' 34
D. "Religion" and the Problem of Western Bias
Another significant part of the problem in attempting to formulate a
dictionary-style (that is, essence-based) definition of religion that will embrace
everything we think of as religion results from a bias within the word
itself. 135 The meaning of the word "religion" developed within a uniformly
Christian (and, since the sixteenth century, Protestant) context. Thus it is a
term that has largely been adapted to the taxonomic needs of western,
Protestant society. 36 It is unsurprising, then, that the term's primary
meanings historically have related to features of Christianity, especially
than the everyday use of the word poses the risk of establishing a form of religion.
133. See Freeman, supra note 22, at 1534-48. There is little consensus as to the "essence" of religion.
There is, of course, a dizzying array of definitions that have been unsuccessfully proposed in the legal
literature alone over the past three decades. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. But the
confusion is not limited to the law. Anthropologists have also proved unable to agree upon a single
definition that successfully distinguishes all religions from all nonreligions. See JACOB PANDIAN, CULTURE,
RELIGION AND THE SACRED SELF 11 -13 (199 1) (listing and critiquing a range of definitions proposed within
the anthropological literature). The most popular anthropological definition, based upon the presence of the
"supernatural," has been forcefully criticized by anthropologist Morton Klass as rooted in an atheistic and
scientific worldview and therefore as "too ethnocentric to be of use for cross-cultural study." KLASS, supra
note 108, at 28.
Philosophers have likewise failed to locate any one essence or combination of essences that would
allow them to formulate a persuasive definition of religion. See, e.g., MICHAEL PETERSON ET AL., REASON
AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF 3-6 (1991) (discussing the many definitions of religion that have been proposed
by philosophers and proposing another); NINIAN SMART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 26 (1979)
(discussing the difficulties of formulating a definition of religion). William Alston, a philosopher of
language, argues that religion is an inherently vague concept, unamenable to specific definition. Given the
same borderline case, he argues, "mature native speakers" will disagree as to whether something is or is
not a religion. ALSTON, supra note 120, at 87-90.
134. In two articles that appeared almost simultaneously, George Freeman and Kent Greenawalt both
argued that the search for a dictionary-style constitutional definition of religion was doomed to end in
failure. See Freeman, supra note 22, at 1548; Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 763. What Greenawalt calls
the "dictionary approach" to defining religion involves a quixotic search for an essence of religion, the
presence of which would create the infallible conclusion that the entity in question is religious and the
absence of which would mean that it is nonreligious. Both Greenawalt and Freeman deny that any such
essence exists, arguing instead for a determination of what is or is not a religion based on the process of
analogy. See infra notes 148-154 and accompanying text.
135. Both English and non-English speakers have argued that the language is itself imbued with
Protestant notions of religion. For example, Josiah Strong, a 19th-century American proponent of "manifest
destiny," claimed that the English language, saturated with Christian ideas, was the agent of Christian
civilization throughout the world. See JOSIAH STRONG, America the Embodiment of ChristianAnglo-Saxon
Civilization, in OUR COUNTRY: ITS POSSIBLE FUTURE AND ITS PRESENT CRISES (New York, 1885),
reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE INAMERICAN HISTORY 136, 138 (John F. Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman
eds., 1987). Similarly, Anton Walburg, a German Catholic priest in Cincinnati, argued that English was so
imbedded with Protestant ideas that English-speaking Catholicism could never prosper. See HUDSON, supra
note 33, at 242 (discussing Walburg's views).
136. See Benson Saler, Religio and the Definition of Religion, 2 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 395, 395
(1987) (arguing that the term "religion," in its current usage, reflects primarily western, particularly
Protestant, cultural traditions and experiences).
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churches, worship, and the presence of a divine being. 13 3Religion has, in
fact, frequently been used as a synonym for Protestantism. 1
In its current form, the word "religion" suggests a strong distinction
between the domain of religion and the domain of the secular.139 Such a
distinction is fairly easily made in a society where religious bodies are marked
off by strongly institutional forms. Many cultures, however, make far less of
a sharp distinction between the secular and the sacred than is made within
western culture.' 4° Trying to fit such a culturally conditioned conceptual
framework onto the wide variety of cultural forms existing around the
world-and as a result of immigration, even in the United States
alone-presents an enormous problem. In Sanskrit, for example, there is no
Even within
word corresponding to the English word "religion."''
Christianity, the dualistic connotation of "religion" as standing in opposition
to the "secular" (that is, nonreligious) is rooted in a very Protestant
understanding of a world divided into Luther's "Two Kingdoms. ' " 52 Such a
division between secular and sacred, between the realm of religion and the
realm of nonreligion, is not as firmly recognized within Catholic theology. '
Given such a western, Protestant bias within the term "religion," a bias
written into the Constitution through its use of the word, it is unsurprising that
nonwestern religions present the greatest difficulties for defining religion.
These entities and systems of belief simply do not conform to the Christian
model that lies at the heart of the historical development of the meaning of
religion. Yet most people do not doubt that these nonwestern traditions are
truly "religions" and ought to be covered by the First Amendment. In
classifying belief systems as religions or nonreligions for constitutional
purposes, then, one must be extremely careful about the danger of western
bias. Although such bias is to some extent already inherent in the use of the
word "religion" itself, consciousness of the danger can help to minimize its
effects. This is particularly true if the three areas where bias is most likely to
emerge are kept in mind: first, the assumption that belief in God is an essential
137. See 13 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 123. at 568.

138. See id. We can see a humorous example of such a use of the word in the statement of Parson
Thwackum in Henry Fielding's History of Tom Jones: "'When I mention religion I mean the Christian
religion; and not only the Christian religion, but the Protestant religion- and not only the Protestant religion.
but the Church of England." HENRY FIELDING. THE HISTORY OF TOM JONES 82 (Random House 1943)
(1749), quoted in KLASS, supra note 108, at 17.
139. See KLASS, supra note 108, at 22 (describing the sacred-profane dichotomy associated with the

term "religion" in European-derived societies): Saler. supra note 136. at 395 (discussing the common
understanding of religion as a finite set of beliefs and practices).
140. See KLASS, supra note 108, at 22.
141. See Bimal K. Matilal, Towards Defining Religion in the Indian Contet. in MEETING OF
RELIGIONS 31, 37 (Thomas A. Aykara ed., 1978).
142. See Saler, supra note 136, at 395 (attributing the emergence of a discrete sphere of religion, and
by extension nonreligion, to the Protestant Reformation).
143. Catholic Liberation Theology, for example. establishes transcendence of the religious-secular axis

as a normative goal. See GUSTAVO GUTIERREz, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION 43-46. 86 (Sister Candad
Inda & John Eagleson trans., Orbis Books 1988) (1971).
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aspect of religion; second, the assumption that religions must be accompanied
by certain types of institutional structures (resembling Christian churches); and
third, a sharp distinction between the sacred and the secular (or between the
natural and the supernatural).
E. Three Criteria
I should summarize my conclusions up to this point. For the reasons
discussed in Sections III.C and III.D, as well as the reasons outlined in
Freeman's article,' 44 I have rejected the usefulness of a dictionary-style
definition of religion. Instead, I am looking for a methodology for determining
whether a belief system is (or is not) a religion that satisfies three criteria:
First, it should define religion and not some broader concept, hewing as closely
as possible to the use of the word "religion" in everyday language; 45 second,
it should have the potential to evolve along with the colloquial standards
governing the use of the word "religion"; 4 6 and, third, it should minimize
the risk of judicial, particularly pro-western, bias in the classification of belief
systems by constraining the decisionmaking process. 47 A methodology that
meets these three criteria would represent a significant improvement over the
most popular definitions proposed to date.
IV. A PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING WHAT
CONSTITUTES RELIGION: AN EVOLVING UNDERSTANDING

In an attempt to escape the cycle of proposed essence-based definitions
defeated by appeals to nonconforming (often nonwestern) religions, Freeman
and Greenawalt have both suggested the adoption of methodological
approaches based on analogy.'48 These analogical approaches derive from
Wittgenstein's discussion of "family resemblance concepts" in section 66 of
49
PhilosophicalInvestigations:
Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games and so on.
144. See Freeman, supra note 22.
145. See supra Sections III.A-B.
146. See supra Section III.C.
147. See supra Section III.D.
148. Greenawalt's and Freeman's claims about the impossibility of dictionary-style definitions of
religion are based upon the difficulty of discerning any "essence" of religion. Their arguments are
particularly convincing when considered against the background of a general lack of consensus regarding
the correct descriptive definition of religion in a whole range of disciplines. See supra notes 18-24 and
accompanying text; see also note 133.
149. The term "family resemblance concepts" actually appears in section 67. WITTGENSTEIN. supra
note 119, § 67, at 32; see also JOHN HICK, AN INTERPRErATION OF RELIGION 4 (1989) (discussing family
resemblance concepts).
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What is common to them all?-Don't say: "'There must be something
common, or they would not be called 'games'-but look and see
whether there is anything common to all.-For if you look at them
you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities,
relationships, and a whole series of them at that .... [T]he result of

this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities
overlapping and criss-crossing:50 sometimes overall similarities,
sometimes similarities of detail.
Freeman suggests that courts should operate by comparing the entity seeking
religious status to a "paradigm" of religion.'' The paradigm is itself
constituted by a list of features common, but not essential, to "traditional
Eastern and Western religions. "12 If the entity has more in common with the
"paradigmatic" religion than it does with an admittedly nonreligious system,
then it should qualify as a religion for First Amendment purposes.' 53
Greenawalt's "definition by analogy" with the "indisputably religious" is
almost identical to Freeman's, except that he begins with a baseline of
particular religions.' 54
The insights of Greenawalt and Freeman represent a substantial step
toward a sound methodology for defining religion. One problem with their
approaches, however, is their failure to discuss in more detail the effect of the
actual selection of the "paradigm cases" of religion on the outcome of the
test. 55 The choice made by a judge as to the baseline for comparison can
have a significant impact on her conclusion regarding the nature of the belief
system. Given a particular belief system to classify, the choice of Roman
Catholicism and high church Anglicanism as the baseline of comparison might
lead to one conclusion, Quakerism and Congregationalism to another, and
Voodoo and Santeria to yet another. The degree of commonality between the
entity to be classified and religion (represented by paradigms) depends to a
great degree on what particular religions are chosen as the paradigm cases."'
150. WrITrGENSTEIN, supra note 119, § 66. at 31-32.
151. Freeman, supra note 22. at 1553. This is the way that Alston thinks %c actually do go about

applying the word "religion" to new cases. See ALSTON. supra note 120. at 88-89
152. Freeman, supra note 22, at 1553.

153. See id.
154. Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 767-78.
155. This is more true of Greenawalt than of Freeman. sho does recognize that the selection of the

baseline is important to the outcome. See Freeman. supra note 22. at 1562 (recognizing that Judge Adams's
selection of Thoreau as the paradigm of nonreligion biased his conclusion about Frank Africa* bhelfs in
Africa v. Pennsylvania. 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981)). Nevertheless. Freeman's depiction of the paradigm

religious belief system remains somewhat biased in favor of "traditional" %estem religions. Freeman
provides a list of the characteristics of the "paradigm" religious belief system. See id. at 1553. Freeman
then says that "a belief system will be more or less religious depending on how closely it resembles this
paradigm." Id. But it is clear that more of the characteristics he lists (for example, belief in God) are

present within western religions than within their nonwestem counterparts. This leads to the conclusion that
nonwestern (for example, nontheistic) religious belief systems (that meet the rest of the criteria)
are
inherently "less religious" than western (for example. theistic) ones
156. To the extent that they do discuss the baseline for the comparative process, both Freeman and

HeinOnline -- 107 Yale L.J. 815 1997-1998

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 107: 791

The second problem with Freeman's and Greenawalt's definitions by
analogy is that they would do nothing to constrain the decisionmaking
processes of individual judges. They would leave each judge completely free
to determine whether or not a belief system is a religion according to the
presence or absence of any single characteristic (or combination of
characteristics) the judge chooses.' 57 It is not enough merely to list the
characteristics commonly present in religions. For a definition by analogy to
restrain judicial bias, it must provide some guidelines that actually constrain
the judge's analogical reasoning. The Freeman and Greenawalt approach must
therefore be modified such that it satisfies my three criteria. The "definition by
analogy" can be improved by looking in more detail at the actual analogical
process.
The decision of whether to extend Wittgenstein's family resemblance
concepts to new situations can be broken down into two steps. First, the
decisionmaker must determine her baseline for comparison. That is, she must
decide which items are already included within the boundaries of the term's
usage. Second, she must compare that set of items with the item in question.
Such comparison will involve examining the array of similarities and
differences between the item in question and the set of items already within
the category. 5 Thus, there are two ways in which judges can be constrained
in their evaluation of whether or not something is a religion: first, by limiting
their discretion in choosing a "baseline" of comparison (that is, in determining
what constitutes the existing set of religions with which the belief system in
question will be compared); and, second, by prohibiting them from focusing
on certain characteristics in their process of evaluation, characteristics that
appear to be likely sources of western bias in the analogical process.
A.

Choosing a Baseline

It is possible to think of the pattern of our use of the word "religion" as
similar to an oddly shaped object. Under such a conception, Greenawalt's bare
suggestion that judges use the indisputably religious as a baseline allows
judges to focus on religions concentrated around one facet of this oddly shaped
object to the exclusion of the others. Such a choice of one small segment of
Greenawalt display some of the same biases that motivate the search for a definition of religion in tho first
place. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. Greenawalt exhibits a clear western bias in his
examples of "indubitably religious" organizations that may serve as baselines for comparison: Roman
Catholicism, Greek Orthodoxy, Lutheranism, Methodism, and Orthodox Judaism. See Greenawalt, supra
note 23, at 767. Freeman's approach, based upon characteristics drawn from a number of "Eastern and
Western religions," see Freeman, supra note 22, at 1553, is an improvement over Greenawalt's, but it still
favors western religions, see supra note 155.
157. Both Freeman and Greenawalt admit that their definitions present problems forjudging borderline
cases. See Freeman, supra note 22, at 1565; Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 816.
158. Which characteristics are relevant may vary from case to case, but clearly not all will be relevant
all the time. Some may never be relevant.
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the object as the baseline of comparison works to the detriment of belief
systems that resemble some other "part" of the object not represented within
the baseline.
Freeman's use of a paradigm abstracted from many different religions is
an attempt both to simplify the object into a more manageable shape and to
avoid Greenawalt's error by incorporating a more representative sample. But
this process works to the benefit of items resembling the new, simplified object
and to the detriment of items that resembled just one facet of the original
object. Freeman, recognizing this, proposes establishing a "borderline
' but this suggestion misses the point. Borderline religions can
paradigm,"t59
vary from the simplified paradigm case in countless different ways. Such
variegation could not be captured by a single "borderline paradigm."
Wittgenstein's understanding of family resemblance requires that the
concept of religion be considered in all its irregularity and complexity as the
baseline for comparison. Thus the baseline judges should use in their
analogical process is the existing set of religions in their diversity of belief and
form. By "religions in their diversity of belief and form," I do not mean to say
that judges should take into account every single religion in the world. Instead,
judges should consider a broad range of different particularreligions as the
baseline for comparison with the entity in question. Clearly, that broad range
must include both western and nonwestern (for example, Chinese, African, or
indigenous American) faiths. As a general rule, judges should be required to
compare the belief system in question with at least one theistic religion (for
example, Judaism, Christianity, or certain Hindu sects), one nontheistic religion
(for example, Buddhism), and one pantheistic religion (for example,
Santeria).' 60
By considering a diverse array of particular religions, the judge is more
likely to be sensitive to the deep flexibility and nuance involved in the
meaning (that is, in our use) of the word "religion," thus reducing the risk that
she will rely on features of particular religions that she mistakenly takes to be
159. Freeman, supra note 22, at 1565. He suggests Frank Afnca's belief system as a -bordcrlnc-case
paradigm." Id. "Under these circumstances, other borderline cases could qualify for protection only by
having more in common with the religious paradigm than Africa had." Id.
160. Because western religion focuses so intensely on the deity, the greatest risk of judicial bias arises

with respect to religions that deviate from the theistic model. Thus it is important to require judges to
consider particular religions that lack the concept altogether. The requirement that the judge include
nontheistic and pantheistic religions essentially stands in as a requirement that the judge consider
nonwestern models of religion in making her comparison. A baseline could also be established by requiring
geographical or cultural diversity in the baseline. A judge might, for example, be required to include one
African, one Native-American, one Asian, and one European religion. The problem with such a
geographical approach (as opposed to a conceptual approach like the one I have proposed) is that religions
generally do not confine themselves within fixed boundaries. Christianity could be described as a European
or Asian or African religion, depending upon one's perspective; Islam could be considered both Asian and
African; and Santeria could be considered both African and American. A conceptual categorization of
religion allows for a reasonably diverse baseline without the confusions that would be created by a

geographical categorization.
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essential to all religion. 16 1 Even using this new baseline, of course, the risk
of judicial bias remains (for example, in the selection of the particular
representative religions). The risk, however, is smaller than it would be in a
system where judges had no guidelines at all.
B.

Negative Guidelines

In addition to a new baseline for comparison, I propose the adoption of
certain negative guidelines to constrain the characteristics on which judges may
focus when considering whether or not to classify a belief system as a religion.
These negative guidelines seek to eliminate the most common and egregious
western biases observed in the case law. Although they cannot eliminate
completely the potential for biases in the analogical process, negative
guidelines are preferable to "essences." Mere indicia, unlike the negative
guidelines, do not block the expansion of the constitutional notion of religion,
and, unlike positive indicia, negative guidelines can be expressed as categorical
and binding.
The negative guidelines I propose are based upon the three particular
areas of western bias operating within the use of the word "religion." '62 First,
religious status may not be denied to a belief system because of its failure to
contain a concept of God (or gods). Second, religious status may not be denied
to a belief system because of its particular structural characteristics or lack of
institutional features (for example, clergy or organized worship). Third,
religious status may not be denied to a belief system because of its failure to
focus on or distinguish the sacred, spiritual, supernatural, or other-worldly.
In light of these guidelines, consider Judge Adams's decision in Africa
v. Pennsylvania.t63 In that case, Judge Adams focused on MOVE's lack of
"organizational structure" (that is, its lack of clergy, religious "services" and
"official customs") 64 and on its lack of concern with "other-worldly"
things.' 65 Under the second and third of the proposed negative guidelines,
Judge Adams would have been prevented from considering these issues; he
would therefore have been forced to examine other, less culturally contingent
features of MOVE's belief system. Although the inability to take these features
into account might not have changed Judge Adams's ultimate decision, it likely

161. A detailed comparison of this sort would undoubtedly be a time-consuming exercise. For this
reason, I agree with Judge Adams and Emmerich's suggestion that the definitional question should only
be addressed when it would make a difference to the outcome of the case. See, e.g., ADAMS & EMMERCIti,
supra note 4, at 91. Thus, for example, if a plaintiff would lose a free exercise claim even if his belief
system were classified as a religion, then the court should avoid even addressing the definitional issue.
162. See supra Section III.D.
163. 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981). For a discussion of Africa, see supra notes 70-77 and
accompanying text.
164. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1035-36.
165. Id. at 1034.
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would have caused him to give greater weight to the many features of MOVE
that do closely resemble other religious belief systems: for example, its
concern with purity,' 66 its belief that all things are sacred (as in pantheistic
religions),' 67 and its provision of an ultimate goal for human existence."s
Although the absence of the features outlined in the negative guidelines
is not a valid reason for denying religious status, the presence of these features
may be taken into account as reasons for deciding that a particular belief
system is in fact a religion. Further, the negative guidelines do not prevent
judges from looking to other common features of religious belief systems in
their assessment of a particular group or individual. Indeed, there remain
several particularly useful bases for comparison.' 69
The refusal to submit a belief system to scientific or philosophical
standards of reason and evidence can be highly indicative that the system is a
religion. Many of Frank Africa's beliefs demonstrated this characteristic: his
beliefs that water and raw foods were pure like God, that everything was
sacred, and that living the lifestyle mandated by MOVE would put a person
"in touch with life's vibration."' 7 This criterion is neither a necessary nor
a sufficient condition for finding a belief system to be a religion.' 7' In
combination with other factors, however, it should weigh heavily in favor of
72
granting religious status.
Another example of a useful, permissible locus of comparison with
paradigmatic religions is the nature of the questions answered by the belief
system. Religions tend to be concerned with providing positive answers to
questions regarding the meaning of human existence and the nature of that
existence after death. MOVE would seem to qualify as a religion under this
criterion as well. Its comprehensive categorization of the world as pure and
impure helps to situate the individual within an intelligible normative universe

166. See id. at 1027. Africa called society "'impure" and *'blemished'"while asserting that his raw food

diet was "pure" and "innocent." Id.
167. See id. ("Africa testified that MOVE members participate in no distinct 'ceremonies' or "ntuals'.
instead, every act of life itself is invested with religious meaning and significance -)
168. See id. Africa said that by living according to the teachings of MOVE a person is put 'in touch
with life's vibration," a concept resembling communion with God or Nirvana. Id. Judge Adams failed to
compare MOVE with a particular religion from the pantheisic tradition. Instead. Adams rclied on abstract
definitions of pantheism provided in The Oxford English Dtctionan and in the Encs.dopediaof Philosophs
to deny that MOVE was pantheistic. See id. at 1033 n.16,
169. Although no one of the following three suggested bases for companson is esscntial to religion.
the resemblance of the belief system in question to religious belief systems in any two of these three
features would strongly indicate that a belief system was religious The resemblance in only one or in none

of the suggested criteria would suggest that the belief system was not a religion. There seems to be no way
to formulate a hard and fast rule here. Much depends on such nonquantitiable factors as the degree of
resemblance.
170. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1027.
171. See supra note 100.
172. This is especially true when one considers that it is the failure to subject beliefs to generally
accepted criteria of reasonability that makes religious minonties especially vulnerable See supra Subsection

III.A.2.
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and to guide his actions (much like the cosmology underlying Christian natural
law reasoning)., 73 Nevertheless, a comparison of the nature of the questions
answered by a belief system with those answered by commonly acknowledged
world religions (in combination with other features) can provide strong
evidence that the belief system is a religion.
Finally, the ultimate goals pursued by adherents to the belief system in
question may be compared with those pursued by members of the many world
religions. Common religious goals include, but are not limited to, holiness,
purity, salvation, and union with God or a transcendent reality. Once again,
MOVE satisfies this criterion. Its pursuit of "purity" and union with "life's
vibration" resembles the goals of other religious belief systems. Although not
all religions pursue such goals (some, for example, seek merely to help their
adherents achieve worldly comfort), the presence of such common religious
goals, along with other features, indicates that the belief system is probably a
religion. 174

These criteria suggest that MOVE should have been categorized as a
religion. The criteria can also be used in the other direction. Consider the
example of Marxism. It is comprehensive in its scope, and its adherents often
display a seemingly religious veneration of certain individuals from the history
of Marxist thought (for example, Marx, Lenin, or Trotsky). Although the case
is closer than most people would like to admit, Marxism would not qualify as
a religion under my proposed methodology.

173. See Richard J. Norman, The History of Moral Philosophy, in OXFORD COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY 586, 587 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995). A MOVE supporter at Frank Africa's trial said that "the
MOVE 'religion is total'; it encompasses every aspect of MOVE members' lives." Africa, 662 F.2d at 1028
(quoting Ramona Johnson); see id. at 1027 (describing Africa's beliefs about purity achieved through the
MOVE lifestyle and impurity that results from failing to do so).
174. The mandated baseline of comparison and the three negative guidelines also provide the basis
for systematized appellate review of a judicial determination that a belief system is or is not a religion.
Application of the analogical methodology constitutes a question of law, and is therefore reviewable by
higher courts de novo. See, e.g., Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
508 U.S. 49, 67 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he question ... is purely one of law, which we are
obliged to consider de novo."); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 108
(1990) (describing the appropriate standard of review for questions of law as "de novo"). Failure to
compare the belief system in question with particular religions from the three enumerated categories of
religions would constitute reversible error, as would erroneous reliance on the absence of one (or a
combination) of the traits outlined in the negative guidelines. An appellate court faced with such error could
either apply the methodology properly or, if the facts were insufficient for correct application, remand for
further factfinding and correct application of the methodology.
Further, an appellate court that disagreed with the lower court's conclusions (even if the lower court
applied the test properly) should be allowed to reapply the test using the facts found by the lower court.
As observed above, see supra Section III.B, the process of applying a word to a new situation is not
completely determinate. That is to say, the decision to apply or not to apply the word "religion" to a new
belief system is not completely determined by the concept itself. Hence, the issue of whether a judge is
"right" or "wrong" in her application of the word is really a question of whether most people, when faced
with the same set of facts, would apply the word in the same way. The best way to avoid "error" in the
judicial application of "religion" to new belief systems is for as many different people as possible to
consider the question independently. De novo review allows for a wider consideration of the proper
classification for the belief system than would otherwise occur.
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First, we should note that Marxism meets the third criterion for religion.
The goal of revolution and utopian liberation of the working class plays a role
within Marxism roughly analogous to eschatology within Christian and Jewish
thought. But beyond this, one is hard pressed to find similarities between
Marxism and any accepted religion from within the three categories. When
viewed according to the remaining bases for comparison discussed above,
Marxism bears little resemblance to a pantheistic religion like Santeria, to a
theistic religion like Christianity, or even a nontheistic religion like Buddhism.
Applying the three criteria, we observe that Marxists normally conceive of
their belief system as being a scientifically valid theory of history. That is,
they are willing to subject the predictions of their belief system to the rigors
of the dominant standards of scientific empiricism. Thus the role of reason
within Marxism is not that which we have come to expect from religious
thought. Second, Marxism fails to provide positive answers to questions of
ultimate meaning. Instead, it seeks to dispose of the questions in order to draw
the adherent's attention towards the more important issues of class oppression
and alienation. Thus, in only one of the three respects does Marxism resemble
a religious belief system, and it would therefore be appropriate to classify it
as nonreligious.
V. CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

Analyzed on the basis of the three criteria I set forth in Section II.E, my
proposed methodology for determining whether a belief system is a religion
represents a significant improvement over previously proposed methodologies.
First, my proposal seeks to identify religions and not some broader category
of belief systems. By mimicking the way in which we apply our existing
family resemblance concepts to new situations, the proposed methodology
closely adheres to our use of the term "religion" in everyday language. Second,
the use of negative guidelines, as opposed to positive essences, leaves ample
room for the methodology to expand in the future as our use of the word
"religion" in everyday language changes. Finally, the combination of the
negative guidelines and the requirement that judges consider both western and
nonwestem religions from theistic, nontheistic, and pantheistic traditions
considerably reduces the risk of a pro-western bias in the determination of
religious status."5
The proposed evolving analogical methodology, along with the suggested
negative guidelines, is not a perfect means for determining what is or is not a
175. I recognize that this methodology does not completely eliminate the risk of such bias
Nevertheless, it does seem to represent an improvement over an unfettered definition by analogy Further,
the risk of bias under the proposed definition is preferable to the establishment problems presented by
dictionary-style definitions and to the considerable risk of bias in the current, unregulated system of
adjudication on this issue.
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religious belief system. Nevertheless, it appears to be a fair solution,
considering the vague, indeterminate nature of the word "religion." All other
proposals have either been too narrow, too broad, or too inadequate to improve
on the status quo of no authoritative definition at all.
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